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In view of the sobering findings of science, theology and to a lesser degree metaphysics is confronted with a
humiliating loss, and a need for reinterpretation, of allegories and narratives which have served as guidance to
the perplexed for millennia. Future revolutions of world perception might include the emergence of conscious-
ness and superhuman artificial intelligence from universal computation, extensive virtual reality simulations,
the persistence of claims of irreducible chance in the Universe, as well as contacts with alien species and the
abundance of inhabited planets. As tragic and as discomforting as this might be perceived for the religious
orthodoxy and by individual believers, a theology guided by science may lead us to a better and more adequate
understanding of our existence. The post factum theological options are plentiful. These include dualistic sce-
narios, as well as (to quote Kelly James Clark), a curling or bowling deity, that is, creatio continua, or ex nihilo.
These might be grounded in, or corroborated by the metaphysical enigma of existence, which appears to be
immune and robust with respect to the aforementioned challenges of science.
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2I. HUMILIATING ASPECTS OF SCIENCE
For the individual the Renaissance – morphing into Enlight-
enment and the scientific revolution – brought about an ever
increasing quality of life, wealth and abundance of resources
due to advances in technology, productivity and trades. This
transition was by no means smooth, as the tragic attempts to
silence Giordano Bruno (who refused and got burned by my
church), Galileo Galilei and Baruch Spinoza document. Even-
tually, these improvedmaterial conditions contributed towards
more liberal social and political situations. The open access
dissemination of scientific findings resulted in a corrosion
of ancient suspicions and consents, and also in the erosion
of many theological narratives and beliefs; so much so that
even their reinterpretation as allegories [1, 2] remains precar-
ious. Many contemporaries live their secular lifes “as if” –
that is, fapp: for all practical purposes [3] – God is totally
superfluous, and maybe a construction of the human mind,
but otherwise nonexistent. This motive is reflected in divine
transcendence radically denying any kind of “immanent ho-
liness,” and by postulating a total disentanglement between
God and the universe; thereby making any talk of divine in-
tention or intervention [e.g., Clark’s God–as–Curler (versus
Bowler) metaphor [4]] – also duties such as the mitzvot and
adherence to the laws of halakha [5] – a product of one’s own
imagination; essentially an idolatry [6].
Socially and politically the disentanglement of the age-old
symbiosis between theocracies and secular rulers (allegedly
of God’s grace), resulted in profane societies. Alas secular-
ism is not grounded in the absolute but is intrinsically means
relative. Therefore, it constantly challenges – sometimes in
violent, misguided and individually detrimental outbursts of
revolutions – the appropriation of resources, as well as the
ethics previously dominating religions came packaged with.
On a personal level the individual human mind, “has had to
endure outrages against its naive self-love” [7, Lecture XVIII]
(the German word Freud used is Kra¨nkungen [8, Lecture
XVIII]), accompanied by affronts and traumatic humiliations
for their narcissistic perception of grandiosity, and a loss of
purpose. These involved the abandoning of Earth as the center
of the universe, as well as the theory of evolution [9, 10], es-
sentially claiming that humans are on a continuum with, and
in many respects not so far away from, plants and animals.
Some recent developments include the comparison of the hu-
man and monkey genomes,which has opened up possibilities
to search, locate and identify the “jewels of the our genome . . .
underlying the evolutionarily unique capacities of the human
brain” [11]; and subsequently the creation of transgenic mon-
keys with improved short-term memory and reaction time as
hints of improved cognition capacities [12]. However, this is
no reason for grief, as such disillusionments have been more
than compensated by gains in individual dignity, loss of fear,
and self-determination: very fewwould seriously consider go-
ing back to the old days of “blissfull ignorance.” But this lack
of alternatives may even worsen the desperation.
Some of the most sobering thoughts, inspired by this new
perception of the universe and amounting to nihilism can be
found in Schopenhauer’s “The World as Will and Represen-
tation” [13, Chapter 1]; as well as in the first paragraph of
the young Nietzsche’s opus posthumus “On Truth and Lie in
an Extra-Moral Sense” – I leave it to the reader to contem-
plate the depth of melancholy and despair which overcame
this restless troubled mind [14, 15]: “and yet he still would
not have adequately illustrated how miserable, how shadowy
and transient, how aimless and arbitrary the human intellect
looks within nature.”
II. HUMILIATIONS ON THE HORIZON
In what follows I shall mention a few humiliations which
are yet to come, and can be expected during our pursuit fur-
ther down the scientific lane. Presently these possibilities are
highly speculative, but they are no “unknown unknowns” [16]
as they appear on today’s horizon of imagination.
I will then argue that at least one metaphysical position re-
mains immune to all such affronts: that of the enigma of exis-
tence, the problem of why there exists something rather than
nothing.
A. “Artificial” (machine) intelligence
1. Emergent consciousness through computational processes
Already Alan Turing was pondering the possibility that “ar-
tificial” intelligence capable of higher perceptual functions
such as self-reflection and consciousness could emerge from
“paper machines [17, p. 34] (aka universal Turing machines):
a “man provided with paper, pencil, and rubber, and sub-
ject to strict discipline is in effect a universal machine.” Of
course, no “manly capacity” is required for its execution; the
requirements imposed on a suitable mechanistic agent (such
as a computer processing unit) have been formalized by the
term partial µ–recursive functions formed by three functional
types and three operator types: the constant, the successor and
the projection functions, as well as the composition, the prim-
itive recursion and the minimization operator µ [18, 19].
Rather than presenting a direct argument for the emergence
of “artificial” intelligence Turing concentrated on the imita-
tion game [20] of whether or not a paper machine can be built
which, for all practical purposes, in its transactional behavior
cannot be discriminated from a human. Turing was positive
about this [21]; and the latest instantiations of agents such
as Google Duplex [22] arguable [23, 24] seem to be able to
achieve this goal – at least for simple dialogues related to lo-
gistic tasks.
“Artificial” intelligence, and, in particular, consciousness,
might be perceived as an emerging function of universal Tur-
ing computability. For the sake of extending Turing’s con-
siderations let us formulate the following hypothesis, and call
it the second Turing (hypo)thesis: “given enough time and
space (computational capacity), every paper (aka universal
Turing) machine will eventually develop intelligence.” Let us
call the strong second Turing (hypo)thesis the following state-
ment: “given enough time and space (computational capac-
3ity), every paper (aka universal Turing) machine will eventu-
ally not only develop intelligence but also consciousness.” In
particular, it will pass the Turing’s imitation game test, as well
as Greenberger’s Genesis test [25]: it breaks super rules it was
supposed to obey.
2. “Artificial” intelligence outsmarting humans
Already Turing speculated [21, p. 259] “that once the ma-
chine thinking method had started, it would not take long to
outstrip our feeble powers.” Indeed, one could speculate that,
just like Moore’s law was valid until recently, unboundedma-
chine thinking will reach and go beyond human cognition in
a geometric progression, soon ending in a “singularity” of al-
most infinite cognitive capacity; very much like compound
interest is at the heart of the Matthew effect [26]. Thereby
it is not necessary to start from superhuman capacity [27]
because any nonzero capacity of self-improvement (by self-
reproduction) is sufficient; it would just take “a little longer.”
Indeed there seems to be no principle preventing intelligence
beyond the human capacities [28, 29].
In very specific areas this has been achieved already: ar-
guably the strongest chess as well as Go players in history
are paper machines. The latter ones [30] “played a hand-
ful of highly inventive winning moves, several of which were
so surprising they overturned hundreds of years of received
wisdom.” Recent developments point to directions of au-
tonomous, reflexive learning [31]: “reinforcement learning
systems are trained from their own experience, in principle al-
lowing them to exceed human capabilities, and to operate in
domains where human expertise is lacking.” Transfer learn-
ing is based on the idea that training a machine on certain
tasks, thereafter followed by the elimination of certain layers
and components while maintaining “deeper” levels of train-
ing, is another method of optimizing performance on totally
new tasks.
It can be expected that universal Turing (paper) machines
will achieve saturation in intelligence tests way beyond human
capacities, reaching ceiling scores at tests designed to mea-
sure human intelligence quotients. Therefore new schemes
will have to be designed to properly measure the super-human
capacities of paper machines.
Whether and how human “fleshware” will survive an “arti-
ficial” intelligence supremacy remains to be seen. Listening to
the philosophical, metaphysical, and theological rants of pa-
per machines exceeding human capacities will be fascinating;
let alone their findings in science and technology [32]. It is
not unlikely that future space probes from Earth – or alterna-
tively, close encounters with alien crafts from exoplanets and
outer space – might be populated by such entities, because it
is not too unreasonable to speculate that “artificial” intelligent
machinerywill have developed before interstellar space travel.
Of course, it might be tempting – and, indeed, this cannot be
excluded at the moment – to maintain that papermachines will
never develop consciousness and “a soul” in a human sense,
that the cognitive capacities of “artificial” intelligence on the
one hand and consciousness on the other hand must be con-
sidered as being completely distinct and not covarying; even
if a machine would pass all conceivable tests and convinces
humans of their possessing consciousness. The “quality” of
a human self might be very different from any consciousness
a paper machine might develop; just as we pretend this to be
true for the cognitive capacities of plants or animals (other-
wise we should consider ourself murderers). To these objec-
tions one may respond that the same criticism may be raised
against the existence of other humans – after all we may be
living in a “Cartesian prison” [33, Meditation 1.12] – a vir-
tual reality inhabited by just one consciousness, namely “us”;
that is, you (exclusive) or me. Another immediate objection
might be that the human deficiency in chess and go is akin
to trying to compare human performance in say, marathon,
with a car. After all, special purpose machines were devel-
oped to outperform humans in a variety of disciplines. Yet I
am inclined to believe that some general cognitive supremacy
“feels” very differently frommotoric, low-complexmechanis-
tic advantages, or even gaming excesses.
Suppose for a moment that the strong second Turing
(hypo)thesis turns out to be correct, and cognitive capacities
and consciousness tend to be covarying. In such a scenario it
might still be viable to ask whether it might be possible to uti-
lize the cognitive superiority of paper machines while at the
same time preventing them from becoming conscious. How-
ever, one may strongly doubt that in general this is possible,
because restrictions on their processing capacities – such as
the impeding and blocking the implementation of one or more
necessary functions and operations – might strongly diminish
their performance and usefulness in other areas. By definition,
as long as an implementation turns out to be Turing universal,
there is not way of excluding certain (computable) functional-
ities. Also, it would be impossible to prevent in principle the
realization of full implementations of paper machines; every-
where and always.
B. Extraterrestrial, alien life
Speculations about the emergence of “artificial” intelli-
gence through paper machines are related to suppositions that
also extraterrestrial forms of conscious “alien” life have de-
veloped. Indeed one may consider the latter as a corollary of
the former: because the same universe which enabled the ma-
terial realization of the functions and operators forming paper
machines on one planet – for instance, on Earth – allows other
realizations of paper machines on different planets as well.
So, one may ask [34, 35], “where is everybody?” Vari-
ous official [36, 37] and inofficial [38] reports emphasize that
occasionally observed unidentified flying objects (UFOs) are
most likely unidentified aerial phenomena (UAPs) of terres-
trial origin. In any case, if they are hypothetically and spec-
ulatively interpreted as alien crafts they are perceived as pre-
senting no threat to the respective national defense [39]. There
may be a lot of options why no direct and commonly acknowl-
edged contact has happened so far; the most prominent being
the zoo hypothesis [40]: the potential aliens see no advantage
in a mutual exchange and observe us with a quasi-ethnological
4interest.
Of course, there exist less benign motives for extraterres-
trial aliens for not contacting us; in particular, if Earth is lo-
cated within a galactic hypercivilization [41]. An official ex-
change with supposedly technologically advanced alien civi-
lizations could be perceived as a lose-lose transaction for both
sides. Because from the point of view of the primitive cul-
ture (“us”) and their indigenous political, social, scientific and
religious institutions, acknowledgment of some pervasive sci-
entific and technological superiority might be accompanied
by a widespread dissolution of (human) values and beliefs.
Of course one cannot exclude that visiting aliens might not
want to get baptized, or convert to Judaism or Islam; but, as
ethnological records of European colonialism show, chances
are high that current theocracies will be superseded by alien
conceptions and theocracies. The best terrestrial theology can
hope for is the inclusion of their beliefs in a pantheon; just like
the Romans processed peripheral deities.
For the aliens any exchange might be not so much a ques-
tion of “us attacking them” (akin to aggressions of an ant to-
ward an elephant); nevertheless, a much subtler issue is re-
lated to the buildup of population pressure in subjugated terri-
tories; a kind of “osmosis” – an “imperial backflow” of indi-
viduals from the periphery towards the centers, with negative
effects on the advanced civilization [42]. And unlike historic
colonizations on Earth, any hypercivilization has very little to
gain from conquering Earth, as human labor might be consid-
ered excessively ineffective compared to the alien technology
employed, and all material commodities can be plentifully ob-
tained and harvested elsewhere – on uninhabited planets or
rocks – most likely in an automated, robotic way. In short,
from the point of view of a galactic hypercivilization Earth
might be rather seen as a liability than an asset. Aliens might
perceive “us” as a potential threat or nuisance which needs to
be contained.
Nevertheless, in the long run, contact with extraterrestrial,
also intelligent, life formsmay be unavoidable – either by “us”
discovering “them”, or, as has been argued earlier to a lesser
degree, buy “them” contacting “us.” Note in this context that
the search for extraterrestrial intelligence by “listening to sig-
nals in the skies” appears utterly naive: it took human civi-
lization a lapse of a century to, say, switch from amplitude
& frequency modulated signaling (such as AM & FM radio
and television communications and transmissions) to digital
transmissions; the latter one essentially being indiscriminative
from white noise without keys to decipher the signal. Con-
versely, a posteriori, white noise can be “interpreted” or “de-
ciphered” as any (intentional) signal one can dream up: in
the most straightforward way consider a “proper” one-time
pad (relative to both the intended message and the supposedly
random sequence extracted from white noise) matching suit-
ably long binary sequences from a white noise source; and
XOR’ing it, bit by bit, with the one time pad, such that a par-
ticular bit of the cleartext is the sum modulo 2 of the corre-
sponding bits of the sequences from white noise and the one-
time pad, respectively.
Moreover, sequences which are, on the one hand, provable
random may, on the other hand, encode a wealth of facts.
For example, Chaitin’s halting probability for prefix-free pro-
grams Ω is both algorithmically incompressible and passes
all statistical tests [43]; and yet it “encodes the solutions to
all halting problems” [44]. Some cosmic signals may well
transmit similar “deep” messages, but we would not be able
to decipher them.
C. Virtual realities
At some point, we might have to accept that we are liv-
ing in a virtual reality created for irritatingly trivial purposes,
such as marketing [45]. The term virtual reality needs further
specification. Suppose that the virtual reality we inhabit is en-
dowed with, and at the same time limited to, universal Turing
machine capacity; that is, it essentially is a paper machine.
There immediately appear to be two options (and a mixture
thereof): either consciousness is an emergent property of pa-
per machines, as is claimed by the second Turing (hypo)thesis
discussed earlier. Or we are immersed in a participatory gam-
ing environment so that whatever constitutes our conscious-
ness “runs” on a substratum – a “beyond” realm, possibly also
a papermachine – which is transcendent relative to the gaming
universe. In this latter, dualistic, scenario, communication is
facilitated by an interface allowing an information flow back
and forth across the gaming reality and the “beyond”. In short,
as stated in one of Godard’s movies [46], we are the “dead on
vacation” (or a penitentiary, or purgatory).
There is an important consequence of the second, dualistic,
option: notwithstanding Spinoza and Leibniz [47] anything
transferred through the interface lacks a sufficient reason or
cause in the respective other realm: the picture is incomplete
if one just concentrates on one such domain; both are tied
together (“entangled”) through the interface – but not causally
so.
D. Order from chaos
Another possibility is that what we perceive as laws
emerged from primordial chaos [48]; and indeed all else [49,
50], including paper machines, can be grounded in the latter.
To get a taste of this conception, Ramsey theory [51] suggests
that informally interpreted, given arbitrary data, “there cannot
be no laws.”
The contemporary narrative of theoretical physics can be
interpreted as corroboration of this assumption, as, for in-
stance, all photon emissions (spontaneous or stimulated) oc-
cur at random times. As stated by Born in 1926 [52, p. 866]
[English translation in [53, p 54], “from the standpoint of our
quantummechanics, there is no quantity which in any individ-
ual case causally fixes the consequence of the collision; but
also experimentally we have so far no reason to believe that
there are some inner properties of the atom which condition a
definite outcome for the collision. Ought we to hope later to
discover such properties . . . and determine them in individual
cases? Or ought we to believe that the agreement of theory
5and experiment – as to the impossibility of prescribing con-
ditions? I myself am inclined to give up determinism in the
world of atoms.”
E. Relativity of morality
The following could be understood as a gig into
metaethics [54, 55], a subject of concern already to Plato [56],
from a scientific angle.
1. Means related uncooperative behavior due to brain injuries
Let me point out up-front that, even before going into the
problematic semantics of morality, there are “trivial” cases
of “sinful” behaviors. No ethical component whatever is in-
volved insofar as the individual committing such behavior is
concerned. Because they originate from, and are caused by,
such an individual’s brain damages.
I am not talking about autonomous decisions which are
willful in any form. Any such cases do not at all relate to
willful actions of an “evil soul.” This is about involuntary be-
havior – severe disorders and dysfunctionalities of the mind,
sometimes included in but not restricted to theDiagnostic and
Statistical Manual (DSM-5) [57] – and caused by a defective
brain (functionality). Even before religion, contemporary psy-
chiatry is to blame for this confusion of “profoundly immoral
and wicked evil” with sickness. Let me quote Amen [58]:
“. . . psychiatrists are the only medical specialists that virtu-
ally never look at the organ they treat. . . . just more medi-
cation thrown at him in the dark . . . or behavior therapy . . .
which if you think about it is really cruel: To put him on a be-
havior therapy program when behavior is really an expression
of the problem [[but]] it’s not the problem.” To consider such
an individual “sinful” or “evil” is like blaming an immobilized
person for not being able to walk.
Brain injury syndromes that express themselves by symp-
toms such as psychopathy appear to be widespread but often
remain unrecognized. Punishing a “criminal” for a disease
of the brain is not only inappropriate but also dangerous, as
the untreated malady will reveal itself over and over again,
thereby causing harm to, and suffering of, the sick individual
as well as others affected. In such cases it appears to be utterly
useless to call for morality and contemplate “evil;” all that is
required is a cure or, if a cure appears to be unattainable by
present means, a containment of the causes (and effects) of
such conditions.
2. Historic and ethnic evidence
Most religions come packaged or “bundled up” with their
own moralities, as well as “dos” and “don’ts” – such as the
prohibition of cross-dressing in Deuteronomy 22:5 New In-
ternational Version (NIV): “a woman must not wear men’s
clothing, nor a man wear women’s clothing, for the Lord your
God detests anyone who does this.” – it seems this applies
to most contemporary women, and also to this Author. And,
by the way, Deuteronomy 22:11 advises “do not wear clothes
of wool and linen woven together.” A little later one finds in
Deuteronomy 22:20 that “if . . . no proof of the young woman’s
virginity can be found,” Deuteronomy 22:21 “she shall be
brought to the door of her father’s house and there the men of
her town shall stone her to death.” This Author finds it diffi-
cult to even attribute some allegorical [1, 2] value to such ver-
dicts – nonetheless, they are imparted in a core text of Abra-
hamitic tradition.
Indeed, from a contemporary European viewpoint, aspects
of different religions, such as the Vedic casts, partitioning hu-
mans into Brahmins (theocracy), Kshatriyas (administrators
and warriors), Vaishyas (artisans, farmers), Shudras (work-
ers) – and not even mentioned but implicitly implied, Pariahs
(untouchables) – present equally disagreeable clauses. One
might speculate and ethnology seems to suggest that, as new,
hitherto disentangled, territories learn about each other, their
respective moralities and “customs” oftentimes both “over-
lap” and are very different. to quote Montaigne [59, Chap-
ter I, Section 23 , p 389.5-390.5/3320], “[C] The laws of con-
science which we say are born of Nature are born of custom;
since man inwardly venerates the opinions and the manners
approved and received about him, he cannot without remorse
free himself from them nor apply himself to them without self-
approbation. . . . [A] But the principal activity of custom is
so to seize us and to grip us in her claws that it is hardly in
our power to struggle free and to come back into ourselves,
where we can reason and argue about her ordinances. Since
we suck them in with our mothers’ milk and since the face of
the world is presented thus to our infant gaze, it seems to us
that we were really born with the property of continuing to act
that way” It might be interesting to look for reasons of accord
& discord of the various customs and ethics encountered.
3. Inconsistency of moralities
A further troubling matter is that, even within a given eth-
nic and ethic framework, there may exist two or more moral
rules which appear right if seen individually, but are mutually
contradictory if applied simultaneously. Hence viewed rela-
tive to one rule – which is thereby implicitly considered to be
“right” – all other such “complementary” ones are found to be
“wrong;” and vice versa. The associated tasks to appropriate
“rightness” and “wrongness” may by no means be trivial, and
may depend on, and be relative to, various priorities which
cannot be weighted a priory.
One immediate, pressing example is the programming of
autopilots [60] in cars et cetera, often referred to as the trol-
ley dilemma [61–63], and is related to collateral damage: is
it, for instance, right, to program the autopilot in a way which
would allow or even demand that, in a situation of exclusivity
(exclusive or), the life of two elderly people will be sacrificed
to save one teenager; or should it be the other way round?
And in any case, how many elderly ought to compensate one
teenager? (A possible option would be to age identify poten-
tial targets individually, and subsequently, weigh and maxi-
6mize the sums of the average life expectancies of the respec-
tive target groups.) And what about the passengers? Would
anybody buy a car knowing that the autopilot might poten-
tially sacrifice one’s life for the sake of others? Or should
the autopilot decide whom to potentially kill and rescue on
the basis of a random number generator? Autonomously driv-
ing cars implicitly need built-in rules deciding such issues “on
the spot;” that is, in cases of accidents or emergencies. Even
if it does not want to decide, it has to act somehow – just
as one cannot choose not to communicate [64], or not find
laws [51, 65].
Another example is the appropriation of wealth among
members of a society; and, in particular, what Dirac referred
to as [66] “the basic principles of modern human society. The
first is contained in the fact that we all acknowledge that it
is a good thing for parents to take care of and provide for
their children, the second, that all children should be given
an equal chance, that is, the same opportunities, for develop-
ment. . . . However, it takes little to see that these two prin-
ciples, each undoubtedly an excellent principle by itself, con-
tradict each other. For, if some parents make conditions better
for their children through sacrifices, these children will nec-
essarily have a better chance than those others whose parents
either do not bother or are unwilling to make comparable sac-
rifices.”
A third example is a situation, exposed by Brecht’s The
Good Person of Szechwan [67]. In this play, the lead char-
acter, the “good person” Shen Teh, in her kindness and good-
ness, becomes exploited by various characters of “the mob”
until she becomes dysfunctional and broken. At this point,
in order to protect and sustain her good intentions, Shen Teh
has to impersonate as the created vicious cousin Shui Ta – the
“bad guy.”
4. Instability of societies
The Matthew effect of accumulated (dis)advantages [26] –
“the ones who have plenty will receive more, and the ones
who have little will lose more” – is a built-in feature of our
universe which fosters progress through catastrophes but at
the same time destabilizes societies, economies, and societies
at large. It is mentioned by Matthew 13:11-12& 25:29 as well
as by Mark 4:25 and Luke 8:18 & 19:26.
Mathematically, the Matthew effect is formalized by the
compound interest, which grows exponentially. The growth or
decline appears linear at small timescales: at “small enough”
deviations from its point of Taylor expansion an exponential
function can be approximated by a linear Taylor polynomial;
thereby neglecting the effects of degree two and higher.
Compound interest is at work in all aspects of human
life and societies, eventually yielding instabilities due to the
buildup of huge imbalances. Negating its devastating – but
also revolutionary and reviving – thrust is akin to “running
against a wall.”
5. Paradoxes of freedom, tolerance, and weakness
According to Plato [56, 562b-563e], an excess of liberty
and freedom yields anarchy and then tyranny. Because if (col-
lections of) individuals consider themselves free of any rules,
the rules and authority get corrupted and “inverted” [56, 562e-
563a, p. 275]: “A father, for example, gets used to being like
a child, and being afraid of his sons. A son gets used to be-
ing like his father. He feels no respect and fear of his parents.
All he wants is to be free. Immigrants are put on par with
citizens, and citizens with immigrants.” Chaos ensues [56,
563d-e, p. 276]: “In the end . . . they take no notice of the
laws . . . in their determination that no one shall be the mas-
ter over them in any way at all.” Then, according to Plato,
these squanderings and excesses of freedom [56, 563e-564a,
p. 277]: “produce a violent reaction in the opposite direction.
. . . the chances are that democracy is the ideal place to find
the origin of tyranny – the harshest and most complete slavery
arising . . . from the most extreme freedom.”
Popper phrases the paradox of tolerance [68, Chapter 7,
Footnote 4] in terms of a “diagonalization argument” (a kind
of paradoxical self-negation by substitution very common in
metamathematics [69–71]): “Unlimited tolerance must lead
to the disappearance of tolerance. If we extend unlimited tol-
erance even to those who are intolerant, if we are not pre-
pared to defend a tolerant society against the onslaught of the
intolerant, then the tolerant will be destroyed, and tolerance
with them.” (I disagree with Popper’s interpretation of Plato’s
paradox of freedom reviewed earlier.)
One strategy, inspired by metamathematics [70], is to avoid
such paradoxes by restricting the respective means – in this
case freedom and tolerance – to instantiations which cannot
produce an undesired event (such as inconsistencies). Of
course, the question of extent and appropriateness of such
measures of censorship remains unresolved and will be dis-
cussed later.
Nietzsche [72] set out to criticise the kind of “slave moral-
ity” he ascribed to Christianity (and, one might argue, by
transitivity, socialism, and communism) which he consid-
ered being based upon the re-interpretation – in an Orwellian
newspeak sense, doublethink [73] – of weakness as strength;
and strength as a weakness. (This can be considered just an-
other kind of diagonalization.) By contrast, “master morality”
and the “will to power” as it is exposed in Thucydides’ His-
tory of the Peloponnesian War, in particular, the Melian dia-
logue [74, Chapter V, § 89] taking place in the summer of the
sixteenth war year, appears pragmatic and sober: “in the hu-
man sphere judgments about justice are relevant only between
those with an equal power to enforce it, and that the possibil-
ities are defined by what the strong do and the weak accept.”
“. . . submission would save you from suffering a most terri-
ble fate, while we would profit from not destroying you [74,
Chapter V, § 93].” “. . . your enmity does us less harm than
your friendship; that would be taken by our subjects as a sign
of weakness on our part, while your hatred is a sign of our
strength. [74, Chapter V, § 95].”
76. Morality by game theory
From what has been mentioned earlier it should be clear
that, at least by present rationalmeans, the distinction between
“right” and “wrong,” or “good” and “bad” behavior cannot
be given in any objective, absolute sense. (This cannot out-
rightly exclude absolute or objective moral criteria but, be-
cause of possible paradoxa from constructions involving self-
contradicting substitutions, their prospects can be conjectured
to be slim.) Moreover, from a scientific point of view, many
commandments, such asMoses’ “thou shalt not kill,” or ”thou
shalt not steal” are sociologically, psychologically and polit-
ically advantageous. But even these profound desiderata ap-
pear means and context relative; inhibited and even reversed,
for instance in times of war. For the sake of an example,
consider McNamara referring to the firebombing air raids of
Japanese cities duringWorldWar II [75]: “was there a rule · · ·
that said you shouldn’t bomb, shouldn’t kill, shouldn’t burn to
death a hundred thousand civilians a night? LeMay said if we
lost the war we would all have been prosecuted as war crimi-
nals. And I think he’s right. He and I’d say I, were behaving
as war criminals.”
Oftentimes food restrictions – in particular the killing of
animals and the processing of their cadavers – have been
and still are medically reasonable; in particular in hot coun-
tries. Others commandments, such as the ones discussed ear-
lier in Deuteronomy 22, or ritualistic ceremonies, might be
considered as expressions of intolerance, or even malignant
Obsessive-Compulsive Disorders at worst. Many such tradi-
tions and rules appear inconsistent, outdated and queer.
Most importantly the entire body of ethics is incapable
of handling quantitative issues of appropriation and guid-
ance. These involve central questions of the (re)distribution
of wealth, but also ways to steer vehicles. Ancient traditional
moralities are therefore insufficient for the need for techno-
logically advanced civilizations.
Therefore it has been proposed to base a quantitative, for-
malized morality on mathematical concepts; in particular, on
game theory [76–82]. Instead of going into details consider
a widely successful TIT FOR TAT strategy [78, 83, 84]: “co-
operate initially, and thereafter cooperate if the other side co-
operated last time and defect if the other side defected last
time.” Computer simulations (such as for the iterated Pris-
oner’s Dilemma) and mathematical analysis demonstrate that
cooperation and altruism based upon reciprocity emerges and
proves stable in a world without a central authority, and in-
habited by egoists – an evolution of cooperation and secular
norms [85–88].
In such a relative, emergent, view morality presents itself
as a huge and complex canvas of partially overlapping and
partially conflicting strategies at various levels; like an onion
of unknown extension and depth, a patchwork of fined tuned
compromises.
Nietzsche could not have foreseen these developments.
Therefore his rant against religion, in particular, Christendom,
was strongest in criticism but weakest when it came to posi-
tive alternatives – for instance, the “will to power” is all but
one of many principles upon which good strategies need to be
based.
III. DECONSTRUCTION OF THE SCIENTIFIC CLAIM OF
TRUTH
So far it appears that science has been on the offensive
and religion on the defensive. Nothing could be farther from
the subject in question. Because all matters discussed earlier
barely scratched the surface, the phenomenology, of our exis-
tence, and the existence of the universe “around us.”
Alas, as all matters invented, created and practiced by hu-
mans – and despite its liberating and beneficial consequences
– science itself cannot claim any absolute truth or exclusivity
but remains “suspended in free thought.” By its own skep-
tical standards, nothing indicates that its very basis is not
formed by metaphysical concepts grounded solely in our be-
liefs in them, which are further expanded into narratives of
great “material” and practical usefulness – resembling song-
lines or dreaming tracks, the songs of Dreamtime, guiding in-
digenous Australians through their territories. Idealism has
simililar suspicions by claiming that [89] “the world is men-
tal through-and-through.”
To quote Nietzsche again [14, 15], “What then is truth? A
movable host of metaphors, metonymies, and anthropomor-
phisms: in short, a sum of human relations which have been
poetically and rhetorically intensified, transferred, and em-
bellished, and which, after long usage, seem to a people to
be fixed, canonical, and binding. Truths are illusions which
we have forgotten are illusions . . . After all, what is a law of
nature as such for us? We are not acquainted with it in it-
self, but only with its effects, which means in its relation to
other laws of nature – which, in turn, are known to us only as
sums of relations. Therefore all these relations always refer
again to others and are thoroughly incomprehensible to us in
their essence . . . All that conformity to law, which impresses
us so much in the movement of the stars and in chemical pro-
cesses, coincides at bottom with those properties which we
bring to things.” Similar thoughts have been expressed by
Camus [90, 91]: “You explain this world to me with an image.
I realize then that you have been reduced to poetry: I shall
never know. Have I the time to become indignant? You have
already changed theories. So that science that was to teachme
everything ends up in a hypothesis, that lucidity founders in
metaphor, that uncertainty is resolved in a work of art. What
need had I of so many efforts? The soft lines of these hills
and the hand of evening on this troubled heart teach me much
more.”
In a less poetic and more analytic style, many philosophers
of science have expressed similar thoughts, in particular also
Lakatos [92] and van Fraassen [50]. Hertz [93, 94, Introduc-
tion] expressed it this way: “We form for ourselves images
[[chimera, the German original is Scheinbild]] or symbols of
external objects; and the form which we give them is such that
the necessary consequences of the images in thought are al-
ways the images of the necessary consequents in nature of the
things pictured. . . . we do not know, nor have we any means of
knowing, whether our conceptions of things are in conformity
8with [[the things]] in any other than this one fundamental re-
spect.” Einstein later notes [95]: “Reason gives the structure
to the system; the data of experience and their mutual rela-
tions are to correspond exactly to consequences in the the-
ory. On the possibility alone of such a correspondence rests
the value and the justification of the whole system, and espe-
cially of its fundamental concepts and basic laws. But for this,
these latter would simply be free inventions of the humanmind
which admit of no a priori justification either through the na-
ture of the human mind or in any other way at all.” However,
although acknowledging such conceptual issues, Einstein was
no idealist and strongly believed in the possibility of such a
correspondence but gives no reasons why this should be so.
What then are some aspects of the scientific narratives
or songlines presently told? That “almost all” (formally of
Lebesgue measure one) space is totally empty, a void of noth-
ingness. Immersed in that void are point particles of zero ex-
tension, as enumerated by the Review of Particle Physics [96].
These “bricks” forming all objects can be grouped into two
types: so-called bosons and fermions. Whereas the former
ones like to “clog together” if they are identical, the latter ones
abhor their kin: there cannot be two identical ones at the same
time and place, thus forcing an “extension” of fermions such
that they “feel apart comfortably.” All elementary bosons but
ones mediate the forces between fermions, and are therefore
responsible for repulsion and attraction, and also for the for-
mation of intermediate structures called “atom” (a misnomer),
whose nucleus also consist of fermions, which in turn consist
of fermions and bosons. One boson, the so-called Higgs parti-
cle, mediates masses and the different strength of interactions.
Every individual process, in particular, the emission and
absorption of light occurs at instances which are irreducibly
“random;” that is, unpredictable by any paper machine. There
is no sufficient cause for such emissions and absorption; par-
ticles are emitted by creatio continua. What you see is from
spontaneous emissions which can only be predicted proba-
bilistically but not individually.
So, according to the present scientific narrative, swimming
in the waters of Macedonia’s Lake Ohrid, or of the Irrsee in
Austria’s Salzkammergut, is moving through an emptiness,
nothingness – swimming is traversing a void containing par-
ticles which, if one would attempt to measure their size, have
no extension at all – for all practical purposes they behave
like singular points. And your body is also mostly emptiness,
nothingness, a void, just like all solid or liquid objects. Those
two voids interact – and their fermions inhabiting them abhor
being together at the same place at the same time – and allow
you to swim. Thereby, the experience of an object “feeling
hard” and impenetrable is reduced to the interaction between
this object and another one which it “touches” (for instance
your hand), and thereby cannot penetrate it.
Never mind the huge epistemic gaps in our comprehension
of the universe: the forces discovered so far have only been
partially identified and unified into a comprehensive “standard
theory” – alas defying gravity. There are issues related to far-
away things in the sky – such as the rotation of galaxies –
which are inexplicable by the aforementioned songlines. In
order to cope with these deficiencies, a hypothetical form of
matter has been postulated and assuringly called “dark mat-
ter” (as it does not emit or interact with light). It is supposed
to be ubiquitous in the universe and amounting for most, that
is, more than 80%, of the stuff (matter) there exists. The stan-
dard model of cosmology also requires another hitherto un-
known form of energy known as “dark energy” permeating all
of space and accelerating the expansion of the universe. Dark
energy and dark matter combined are supposed to account for
most, that is, 95%, of the total energy of the universe. Current
songlines also contend that the universe started with a “big
bang” and expands ever since.
Quantum mechanics basically amounts to a theory of vec-
tors and their generalized length preserving rotations. It is
inconsistent – in postulating irreversible measurements some-
how arising from a ubiquitous reversible state evolution [97–
100] – and nevertheless highly successful (just as Cantorian
set theory) for all practical purposes [3], predictions and guid-
ance.
IV. HIERARCHIES OF “THROWAWAY” ENTITIES
EXPRESSING LOWER LEVELS OF DESCRIPTION
Before moving on to the metaphysics of existence let me
amend aspects which come up in the discussion of evolution:
that [101] “the ultimate criterion which determines whether
[[a gene]] will spread is not whether the behavior is to the
benefit of the behaver but whether it is to the benefit of the
gene” – “selfish” genes [102] express themselves through in-
dividuals [103]: “an individual organism is a throwaway sur-
vival machine for the self-replicating coded information which
it contains.”
Alas this is an example of not seeing the wood for the trees,
as, to paraphrase Dawkins, genes represent throwaway sur-
vival machines for the laws of the universe which they express.
Rather than dealing with just two layers of description one
should take into account a much wider picture, thereby in-
cluding a multiply layered structure of emergent entities, each
layer having its own justification and characteristic [104]: the
laws of the universe could be perceived as the expressions of
the universe and of its existence (some would call this cre-
ation) – the formation of genes could in turn be perceived as
the expression of the laws governing the universe – the genes
themselves express themselves in the individual bodies – and
individual minds could in turn be perceived as the expression
of the bodies they are associated with.
In this view emergence continues starting from a possi-
bly random, unorganized and “elementary” layer of exis-
tence [105–107]. The process of (self-)organizatzionproceeds
to the “formation of laws and matter,” and towards (by the
strong second Turing hypothesis) the formation of conscious
minds capeable to reflect upon the situation.
Therefore, we are inclined to maintain that this hierarchy
of apparently highly organized patterns and structures, like an
iceberg which is only visible above sea level, is ultimately
grounded in the great metaphysical abyss of existence. This
issue will be discussed next.
9V. METAPHYSICS 101: THE ENIGMA OF EXISTENCE
Previous lives were “full of wonders, mysticism and mira-
cles” [108–110] which have ceased to occur for various rea-
sons; also because of our scientific capacity to causally ex-
plain the phenomena. Even if we don’t know any causes we
tend to assume that this is an epistemic issue, and causes exist:
we just don’t know them. To quote a psychoanalytic motto,
“where id was, there shall ego be.”
Is the world devoid of any even indirect instantiation of
transcendence? Maybe there exist human minds who do not
find their experience of existence to require any explanation
whatsoever: they (and by transgression to an outside world,
the universe they live in) exist; and that’s about it. Indeed, the
enigma of existence might be considered a (sometimes lyri-
cally decorated [111]) pseudo-statement [112–114]. This cri-
tique is based on the assumption that it is possible to find an
“archimedian ontological anchor (or handle),” such as means
and mind independent empirical or logical criteria, – that is, in
Hume’s words [, Sect. XII[34] p. 120]Hume-Enquiry, any ab-
stract reasoning concerning quantity or number, or experimen-
tal reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence – which
could serve as a solid foundation of judgements and progress.
Indeed it might come as no surprise that Carnap [113, 114]
cites Hilbert [115]; as both publications had not yet absorbed
the means relativizing impact of Go¨del’s findings [116] for
metamathematics which appeared in that same year 1931.
However, in what follows it is suggested, or rather maintained
or assumed, that any such critical position, albeit conceivable,
cannot be sustained by any conscious entity “in the long run.”
(I am not talking about the short-term suppression of these
issues for various reasons such as pragmatism or avoidance
of anxieties and bewilderments.) On the contrary, it will be
argued that the mind-boggling fact of our existence is a sub-
jective experience of metaphysical nature
(i) immune to sobering science and rational thought;
(ii) in its most individualistic form, it is even immune to
solipsism as well as idealism [117, 118]. Because who-
ever acknowledges one’s own existence like Descarte’s
“cogito, ergo sum” can at the same time contemplate
about the enigma of existence “why do I exist rather
than not exist?” This quest is independent of whether
one is alone, in a virtual environment of a participatory
game, in a multiple layered simulation [119–121] or in
exchange with other autonomous individuals;
(iii) in its irreducible incomprehensibility, presents a clear
indication and corroboration for a mindset wisened by
the Socratic paradox “I know that I don’t know” (also
used [16] for waging war);
(iv) by analogy suggests that just because we do not under-
stand a thing or two (and maybe never will) those en-
tities cannot exist: existence is both incomprehensible
and existent.
Existence is at the metaphysical root of everything. And
everything which can be scientifically asked or searched con-
tains in its deepest layer also this enigma of existence. To
quote Heidegger [122, 123, Chapter 1,§ 1, p. 5/37], “our ques-
tion . . . is necessarily asked, knowingly or not, along with ev-
ery question.”
The enigma of existence (in a nonsolipsistic form) has
many fathers and ancient roots [124–132]. After Leibnitz in-
troduced [133, p. 639] “the principle that nothing takes place
without a sufficient reason . . . the first question which we have
a right to ask will be, ‘Why is there something rather than
nothing?’ For nothing is simpler and easier than something.”
Later Wittgenstein stated [134, 6.44] “Not how the world is
that is mystical, but that it exists.” Heidegger posed the Angst-
frage in his Freiburg lectures on metaphysics [122, 135]: the
fundamental question of metaphysics . . .: why is there some-
thing [[or that which exists]] rather than nothing? (The Ger-
man original “die Grundfrage der Metaphysik . . .: Warum ist
u¨berhaupt Seiendes und nicht vielmehr Nichts?” has been in-
adequately translated into English [123, 136].)
Of course, as has been mentioned earlier, an immediate re-
sponsemight be that metaphysical questions such as the afore-
mentioned enigma of existence – “why is there something
rather than nothing?” – are meaningless, as only empirical
scientific knowledge derived from experience or the analysis
of language with logic [111–114] is meaningful. To quote
Wittgenstein [134, 4.11], “the totality of true propositions is
the whole of natural science (or the whole corpus of the nat-
ural sciences).” Wittgenstein’s final slogan [134, 7] “What
we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence” serves
a sort of cartoon blog (this author is bewildered by the fame
Wittgenstein received outside of Vienna – there he might have
been fared as not very original; a talkative narcissist), and
puts him in a row with venerable representatives of the “why
botherers” [3] such as Dirac and Feynman [137, 138]. In any
case, nagging questions should be kept in mind with evenly-
suspended attention [139, 140] rather than suppressed, as any
kind of suppression (into the unconsciousness) alleviates one-
self from coping with the issue immediately but bears the dan-
ger of neurosis (and resurrection of that which has been sup-
pressed) by integration of the suppressed content into one’s
character – in this case, by analogy, into the realm of human
thought. Also, disallowing questions might turn out to inhibit
innovation.
Another response would be a subjective one by meditating
about one’s own undeniable experience of existence. Thereby,
one could ask about the enigma of one’s own existence, and
acknowledge its incomprehensibility.
If one accepts the issue as relevant then it is robustly so
with respect to all variants of attacks. For instance, we might
be living on a “Russian doll” like layered virtual reality, even
without any “bottom layer;” and we may even get a feel for
why these structures have been made by “looking down” and
acknowledging one transcendent layer. But then the question
remains about the existence of the respective “lower” layer,
until by transitivity, one has reached the “bottom layer” or
continues asking.
Allowing the quest for the enigma of existence opens up an
abundance of possibilities and narratives – often nonverifiable
or unfalsifiable – which could lead one to a better, more hum-
ble, understanding of our limits of thought, and of that which
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could be conceived as being possible, but need not necessarily
be so. This suggests a more open-minded, lenient interpreta-
tion of the scriptures; and of religious experience in general.
Let me close with a pagan adagium cited by Erasmus of
Rotterdam [141, 3:1232, p. 240-241]: VOCATVS ATQVE IN-
VOCATVS [[or NON INVOCATVS]] DEVS ADERIT: called
or not called, God will be present.
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